Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to …rm value may weaken the incentive e¤ects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the optimal contract in a setting where the CEO can a¤ect …rm value through both productive e¤ort and costly manipulation, and may undo the contract by privately saving. The optimal contract takes a surprisingly simple form, and can be implemented by a "Dynamic Incentive Account." The CEO's expected pay is escrowed into an account, a fraction of which is invested in the …rm's stock and the remainder in cash. The account features state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting. It is constantly rebalanced so that the equity fraction remains above a certain threshold; this threshold sensitivity is typically increasing over time even in the absence of career concerns. The account vests gradually both during the CEO's employment and after he quits, to deter short-termist actions before retirement.
Introduction
Many classical models of CEO compensation consider only a single period, or multiple independent periods. However, the optimal static contract may be ine¤ective in a dynamic world where the CEO's current actions impact future periods. For example, short-term contracts can encourage the CEO to manipulate the current stock price at the expense of long-run value. By privately saving, the CEO can achieve a higher future income than intended by the contract, reducing his incentives to exert e¤ort. Securities given to incentivize the CEO may lose their power over time: if …rm value declines, options fall out-of-the-money and bear little sensitivity to the stock price. In addition to the above challenges, a dynamic setting provides opportunities to the …rm -it can reward e¤ort with future rather than current pay. This paper analyzes a dynamic model that allows for all of the above complications, which are likely important features in real life. We take an optimal contracting approach which allows for fully history-dependent contracts without restrictions to particular contractual forms. Despite the complexity of the setting, the e¢ cient contract is surprisingly simple. The model's closed form solutions allow the economic forces behind the contract to be transparent and its intuition to be clear, as well as facilitating its implementation in practice.
In our baseline model, the CEO makes only an e¤ort decision and has no option to manipulate earnings or privately save or borrow. This provides a benchmark against which to analyze the e¤ect of introducing these complications. In the optimal contract, log consumption is a linear function of current and all past stock returns. The rewards for exerting e¤ort are thus spread across all future periods, to achieve intertemporal risk-sharing. In an in…nite-horizon model, the sensitivity to returns is time-independent: in a given period, consumption is a¤ected by current and past returns to the same degree, and this sensitivity remains the same in every period. With a …nite horizon, the sensitivity is increasing over time -the "increasing incentives principle." The contract is more sensitive to current than past returns, and the sensitivity to current returns intensi…es as the CEO becomes older. This is for two reasons. First, holding constant the total lifetime reward for e¤ort (i.e. change in NPV of future pay, or change in wealth), this reward is spread across fewer periods and so the reward in the current period (i.e. change in pay) must increase. Second, the total lifetime reward must also increase. As a risk-averse agent becomes older, a given increase in wealth provides him with less utility as he is forced to consume it over fewer periods; therefore, the increase in wealth for exerting e¤ort must rise to maintain incentives. We thus generate a similar prediction to Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , but without invoking career concerns.
We then allow the CEO to engage in manipulation, i.e. in ‡ate the current stock price at the expense of future returns. In practice, this may entail changing accounting policies, concealing information or scrapping positive-NPV projects; we also allow for negative manipulation. The possibility of manipulation requires the optimal contract to change in two ways to prevent such behavior. The CEO's income is now sensitive to …rm returns after retirement, to deter him from in ‡ating the stock price just before he leaves. In addition, the contract sensitivity now rises over time, even in an in…nite-horizon model. The CEO bene…ts immediately from short-termism as it boosts current pay, but the cost is only su¤ered in the future and thus has a discounted e¤ect. An increasing slope o¤sets the e¤ect of discounting by ensuring that the CEO loses more dollars in the future than he gains today. We also allow the CEO to engage in private savings. This possibility does not change the contract's sensitivity but a¤ects the level of pay, causing it to increase faster over time. Rising pay e¤ectively saves for the CEO, removing the incentive for him to do so privately.
In practice, our optimal contract can be implemented in a simple manner. When appointed, the CEO is given a "Dynamic Incentive Account"("DIA"): a portfolio of which a given fraction is invested in the …rm's stock and the remainder in cash. Mathematically, the fraction of pay in stock equals the sensitivity of log pay to stock returns, and so it represents the contract's sensitivity. As time evolves, and …rm value changes, this portfolio is constantly rebalanced to ensure the fraction of stock remains su¢ cient to induce e¤ort at minimum risk to the CEO. For example, a fall in the share price reduces the equity in the account below the required fraction; this is addressed by using cash in the account to purchase stock. If the stock appreciates, some equity can be sold without falling below the threshold, to reduce the CEO's risk.
The following numerical example illustrates the role of rebalancing. The CEO is considering whether to work, which will increase …rm value by 10%, or take a holiday that is worth 6% of his salary to him. (The higher the salary, the more the holiday is worth since he can spend his salary on holiday.) If salary is $10m, the holiday is worth $600,000. If the CEO has $6m of stock, working will increase its value by 10%, or $600,000, thus deterring the holiday. Therefore, his $10m salary will comprise $6m of stock and $4m of cash. Now assume that the …rm's stock price halves, so that his stock is worth $3m. His total salary is $7m and the holiday is worth $420,000, but working will increase his $3m stock by only $300,000. To ensure continued e¤ort incentives, the CEO's gains from working must be $420,000. This requires him to have $4.2m of stock, and is achieved by selling $1.2m of cash in the account to purchase new stock. The account now comprises $4.2m of stock and $2.8m of cash. Importantly, the $1.2m additional equity is not given to the CEO for free, but accompanied by a reduction in cash. This addresses a concern with the current practice of restoring incentives after stock price declines by repricing options -the CEO is rewarded for failure. While new to executive compensation, the idea of rebalancing incentive portfolios is similar to the widespread practice of rebalancing investment portfolios: both are ways of maintaining desired weights in response to stock price changes.
In addition to continuous rebalancing, the DIA also features gradual vesting: the CEO can only withdraw a percentage of the account in each period. This has two roles. First, it ensures that the CEO has su¢ cient equity in future periods to induce e¤ort. This role requires vesting to be gradual during the CEO's employment. Second, it deters the CEO from in ‡ating earnings and cashing out just before retirement. This role requires vesting to be gradual even after the CEO leaves. Thus, if manipulation is possible, the account does not fully vest until a su¢ cient period has elapsed after departure for the e¤ects of any manipulation to have been reversed.
In sum, the DIA has two key features, which each achieve separate objectives. Statedependent rebalancing ensures that the CEO always exerts the required level of e¤ort, while minimizing his risk. Time-dependent vesting ensures that the CEO always abstains from manipulation, and that he has su¢ cient equity in future periods to incentivize e¤ort. The model thus o¤ers theoretical guidance on how executive compensation might be reformed to address the problems that manifested in the recent crisis, such as short-termism and weak incentives after stock price declines. A number of commentators (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) , Holmstrom (2005), Bhagat and Romano (2009)) have argued that lengthening vesting horizons on stock and options may deter manipulation. Even if such a change could be achieved at little cost, it only solves myopia and does not ensure continued incentive compatibility over time, as it does not involve rebalancing.
Moreover, existing theories demonstrate costs of lengthening vesting horizons, which lead to the optimal vesting horizon being short. In Peng and Roell (2009), long vesting periods increase the CEO's risk by delaying the rebalancing of stock for cash; Bhattacharyya and Cohn (2008) and Brisley (2006) show that this increased risk can deter the CEO from taking risky projects. Such costs arise because vesting and rebalancing are the same event in these models: the CEO can only sell stock when it vests, and so long vesting prevents timely rebalancing and risk reduction. The …rst two papers show that short-vesting stock is optimal; Brisley analyzes options where rebalancing is only necessary upon strong performance, since only in-the-money options subject the CEO to risk. Therefore, as in our model, state-dependent rebalancing is e¢ cient; since rebalancing and vesting are the same event in Brisley, this requires statedependent vesting. Indeed, recent empirical studies (e.g. Bettis, Bizjak, Coles and Kalpathy (2008)) document that performance-based (i.e. state-dependent) vesting is becoming increasingly popular, where vesting is accelerated upon high returns. 1 This may induce the CEO to in ‡ate the stock price (an action not featured in the last two theories) and cash out before the manipulation becomes apparent. Here, vesting and rebalancing are separate events, allowing risk reduction without inducing manipulation -high returns permit sales of equity, but critically the proceeds must remain in the account in case the returns are subsequently reversed. The combination of time-dependent vesting and state-dependent rebalancing thus achieves a di¤erent result from state-dependent vesting -the two separate features achieve the two goals of deterring manipulation and maintaining e¤ort incentives. In addition to the above papers on vesting horizons, our paper is also related to contracting theories in the presence of manipulation. Lacker and Weinberg (1989) identify a class of oneperiod settings in which no manipulation is optimal and linear contracts obtain. Goldman and Slezak (2006) restrict compensation to being on short-term performance, and so feature a tradeo¤ between e¤ort inducement (which increases the optimal equity stake) and manipulation deterrence (which reduces it). Here, the incentive horizon is endogenous and so we achieve both goals without a trade-o¤. More generally, our paper is related to dynamic models of the principal-agent problem 2 Farhi and Werning (2009) . Our modeling setup builds on the multi-period framework of Edmans and Gabaix (2009a) ("EG"), which allows us to derive contracts that are both attainable in closed form and "detail-neutral" -the functional form is independent of the noise distribution and agent's utility function. Since EG restrict the CEO to consuming in the …nal period only, manipulation and private saving are non-issues; Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) similarly have only terminal consumption. He (2008b) also considers a dynamic model with private saving and manipulation. By using the modeling setup of EG, we generate a closed-form contract which allows transparency of the economic intuition and simple implementation via the DIA. Our framework also allows for a continuous action choice and non-linear cost functions. Since our contract links log consumption to stock returns, the relevant measure of incentives is the percentage change in CEO pay for a percentage change in …rm value. This result extends to a dynamic setting Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009), who theoretically justify this incentive measure in a one-period model with a risk-neutral CEO, and empirically show that it is independent of …rm size and thus comparable across …rms of di¤erent size.
The result that the optimal contract exhibits memory (i.e. current pay depends on past output) was …rst derived in Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985) , who consider a two-period model where the agent only makes an e¤ort decision. We extend it to a multi-period model where the agent can also privately save and manipulate. Indeed, Boschen and Smith (1995) …nd empirically that …rm performance has a much greater e¤ect on the present value of future pay rather than on current pay. Moreover, the execution of the contract through an incentive account and thus wealth-rather than pay-based compensation allows a memory-dependent contract to be implemented simply. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) note that a "disappointing implication of [memory-dependence] is that the long-term contract will be very complex,"which appears to contradict the relative simplicity of real-life contracts. This complexity is indeed unavoidable if the CEO is rewarded exclusively through new ‡ows of pay, as these ‡ows will have to depend on the entire history of past outcomes. However, in the DIA, the CEO is also incentivized through his wealth of previously-granted shares. A fall in the share price reduces the CEO's wealth and thus his entire path of future consumption. Future consumption is thus sensitive to past returns without requiring new ‡ows of pay to be history-dependent.
In addition to its results, our paper contributes a number of methodological innovations.
To our knowledge, it is the …rst to derive conditions on the model primitives which guarantee the validity of the …rst-order approach to solve a dynamic agency problem with private savings. The …rst-order approach replaces the agent's incentive constraints against complex multi-period deviations with weaker local constraints (i.e. …rst-order conditions), with the hope that the solution to the relaxed problem satis…es all constraints. 3 This method is often valid if private saving is impossible (hence the one-shot deviation principle), but problematic when the agent can engage in joint deviations to save and reduce e¤ort. This is because saving insures against future shocks to income and thus reduces e¤ort incentives. Our method of verifying the …rst-order approach involves linearizing the agent's utility function and showing that, if the costs of e¤ort and manipulation are su¢ ciently convex, the linear utility function is jointly concave in leisure and manipulation (it is automatic that there is no incentive to save under linear utility). Since the actual utility function is concave, linearized utility is an upper bound for the agent's actual utility. Thus, since there is no pro…table deviation under a linear utility function, there is no pro…table deviation under the actual utility function either. This technique may be applicable in other agency theories to verify the su¢ ciency of the …rst-order approach. The second methodological innovation allows us to solve the full contracting problem. Grossman and Hart (1983) solved the one-period contracting problem in two stages: …nding the cheapest contract that implements a given e¤ort level, and the optimal e¤ort level. We prove in the no-manipulation case that, if …rm value is su¢ ciently large relative to the CEO's wage, the optimal contract must implement maximum e¤ort in every state and in every period (the "maximum e¤ort principle"). This is because the bene…ts of increasing e¤ort are multiplicative in …rm size, but the costs of higher e¤ort (direct disutility of e¤ort, ine¢ cient risk-sharing and informational rents to the CEO) are multiplicative in the CEO's salary. If …rm size is signi…-cantly greater than the CEO's salary, which is true in the vast majority of practical applications, the bene…ts outweigh the costs and so maximum e¤ort is optimal. This solves the second stage of the contracting problem and allows the analysis to focus exclusively on the …rst stage. It thus markedly simpli…es contract design and may be useful for future contracting theories. Similarly, in multi-period models, wealth e¤ects typically cause the optimal e¤ort level to depend on past wealth accumulation, leading to complex intertemporal linkages. The maximum e¤ort principle leads to tractable contracts even in a fully dynamic setup. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup and Section 3 derives the optimal contract when the CEO has logarithmic utility, as this version of the model is most tractable. Section 4 shows that the key results continue to hold under general CRRA utility and autocorrelated noise. It also provides a full justi…cation of the contract: it derives su¢ cient conditions that ensure that the agent will not undertake global deviations, and shows that the principal cannot improve upon implementing maximum e¤ort. Section 5 concludes and Appendix A contains proofs of theorems. In the Online Appendix, Appendix B show that the model is robust to a time-varying cost of e¤ort, Appendix C provides analysis supporting some of the comparative statics, Appendix D o¤ers a microfoundation for the optimality of no manipulation, Appendix E gives the continuous-time version of the contract, and Appendix F contains proofs of lemmas.
The Core Model

Assumptions
We consider a multiperiod model featuring a …rm (also referred to as the "principal") which employs a CEO ("agent"). The …rm pays only a terminal dividend D ("earnings") in the …nal period . In the core model, the terminal dividend is given by
where X represents baseline …rm size and a s 2 [0; a] is the agent's action ("e¤ort"). The action a s is broadly de…ned to encompass any decision that improves …rm value but is personally costly to the manager. The main interpretation is e¤ort, but a low a s can also re ‡ect cash ‡ow diversion or private bene…t consumption. s is noise, which is independent across periods, has a log-concave density 4 , and is bounded above and below by and . (Section 4.1 allows for autocorrelated noises). As in EG we assume that, in each period t, the agent privately observes s before choosing his action a s . EG show that this assumption leads to tractable contracts in discrete time and consistent results with the continuous time case, where noise and actions are simultaneous. This timing is also featured in models where the CEO sees total output before deciding how much to divert (DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)) or report (Lacker and Weinberg (1989) ), as well as models where the CEO observes the "state of nature"before choosing e¤ort (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979) , Sappington (1983) and Baker (1992) ).
After a t is taken, the principal observes a public signal of …rm value, given by:
The incremental news contained in S t , over and above the information known in period t 1 4 A random variable is log-concave if it has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, and the log of this density is a concave function. Many standard density functions are log-concave, in particular the Gaussian, uniform, exponential, Laplace, Dirichlet, Weibull, and beta distributions (see, e.g., Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) ). On the other hand, most fat-tailed distributions are not log-concave, such as the Pareto distribution.
(and thus contained in S t 1 ) can be summarized by r t = ln S t ln S t 1 , i.e.
With a slight abuse of terminology, we call r t the …rm's "return". 5 By observing S t , the principal learns r t , but not its constituent components a t and t . The agent's strategy is a function a t (r 1 ; : : : r t 1 ; t ) that speci…es how his action depends on the current level of noise for each history of returns before time t: After S t (and thus r t ) is publicly observed, the principal pays the agent an amount y t . We allow for a fully history-dependent contract in which the agent's compensation y t (r 1 ; : : : r t ) depends on the entire history of past returns. 6 Having received income y t , the agent consumes c t and saves (y t c t ) at the continuously compounded risk-free rate R. We allow (y t c t ) to be negative, i.e. the agent may borrow as well as save. Such borrowing and saving are unobserved by the principal. Following a standard argument, we can restrict attention to contracts in which the agent chooses not to save or borrow, and instead consumes his entire income in each period (i.e. c t = y t ). For brevity, we use the term "private saving"to refer to saving or borrowing.
The agent's utility over consumption c t 2 [0; 1) and e¤ort a t in each period is given by
where g (a) = ln h (a), the utility cost of taking action a, is an increasing, convex function. u is a CRRA utility function with relative risk aversion coe¢ cient > 0, i.e. u (x) = x 1 = (1 ) if 6 = 1, and u (x) = ln x for = 1.
The agent lives in periods 1 through T and retires after period L T . After retirement, the …rm replaces him with a new CEO and continues to contract optimally. The agent discounts 5 r t is the actual increase in the expected dividend as a result of the action and noise at time t. Given rational expectations, the innovation in the stock return is the unexpected increase in …rm value. In turn, …rm value is the discounted expected dividend. We later derive su¢ cient conditions under which the optimal contract implements the maximal e¤ort a in every period. Therefore, …rm value is given by
where R is the risk-free rate. Therefore, the …rm's actual log return is ln P t ln P t 1 = r t a + R ln E[e t ]. 6 A fully general contract can involve the income y t depending on messages sent by the agent regarding t . The bulk of the analysis conjectures that the optimal contract implements a …xed target action, a , in every period. With a …xed target action, such messages are redundant: the agent's announcement of t would be uniquely determined by r t , since he will make the announcement that maximizes his expected utility. Therefore, the principal can automatically back out the message after seeing r t , and so such messages would convey no additional information to the history of returns: see also EG. We allow the contract to depend on messages when providing the optimality of a …xed target action in Section 4.3. future utility at rate , so that his total discounted utility is given by:
As in Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009), we model e¤ort as having a multiplicative e¤ect on both CEO utility (equation (3)) and …rm earnings (equation (1)). Multiplicative preferences consider private bene…ts as a normal good (i.e. the utility they provide is increasing in consumption), consistent with the treatment of most goods and services in consumer theory; they are also common in macroeconomic models. With a multiplicative production function, e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on …rm earnings and so the dollar bene…ts of working are higher for larger …rms. This assumption is plausible for the majority of CEO actions, since they can be "rolled out"across the entire …rm and thus have a greater e¤ect in a larger company. 7 Edmans et al. …nd empirically that the percentage change in pay for a percentage change in …rm value is independent of size, and show that a model requires these multiplicative speci…cations to deliver the result that this incentive measure is size-invariant. 8 The principal is risk-neutral and uses discount rate R. Her objective function is thus: max fat;t=1;:::Lg;fyt;t=1;::
e Rt y t 1; : : : T g: A consumption strategy is feasible if it satis…es the budget constraint
We use the notation E a and Eâ to highlight that the agent's e¤ort strategy a¤ects the probability distribution over return paths.
In some versions of the model, we allow the agent to manipulate the …rm's returns. Manipulation is broadly de…ned to encompass any action that increases current returns at the expense of future returns. The literal interpretation is changing accounting policies, but it can also involve real decisions such as scrapping positive-NPV investments (as modeled by Stein (1988) and Edmans (2009)) or taking negative-NPV projects that generate an immediate return but have a downside that may not manifest for several years (such as sub-prime lending). We also allow for downward manipulation: the CEO may sacri…ce current returns to boost future returns via overinvestment or "big bath"accounting (taking large write-downs).
In each period t L, at the same time as taking his action, the agent can also engage in manipulation. A single manipulative activity m t;i changes the return from r t = a t + t to
i.e. it rises in period t by m t;i (m t;i ) and falls in period t + i by m t;i .
9
(m s;i ) is the fundamental cost of manipulation, where (0) = 0 (0) = 0, and 00 (m s;i ) > 0. Manipulation destroys value, since it involves undertaking negative-NPV projects, forsaking positive-NPV projects, or using resources to change accounting policies. 1 i M is the "release lag" of the manipulation: the number of periods before the e¤ects of manipulation are reversed. For example, forgoing an project that pays o¤ in the long run will only worsen earnings far into the future, and so the release lag is high. M is the maximum release lag, where M L, i.e. the e¤ects of all manipulation are reversed before the terminal dividend is paid. We allow the CEO to take a vector of M manipulations each period, m t = fm t;1 ; :::; m t;M g, where some 9 Similarly, the signal changes from S t = X exp P t s=1 ( s + a s ) to or all of the m t;i may equal zero. 10 The terminal dividend (1) now becomes
The principal's problem is complex because contracts are history-dependent, the agent can manipulate returns and privately save, and the principal must choose the optimal e¤ort level. Our solution strategy is as follows. We start with a conjecture that the optimal contract involves binding local constraints and, if …rm size X is su¢ ciently high, maximal e¤ort in each period. Following this conjecture we (i) derive the necessary local incentive constraints that a candidate contract must satisfy in Section 3.1; (ii) …nd the cheapest contract that satis…es these local constraints and show that this contract involves binding constraints (Theorem 2 in Section 4.1); (iii) verify that the candidate contract is also fully incentive-compatible, i.e. prevents global deviations (Theorem 3 in Section 4.2); (iv) verify that the candidate contract is optimal among all contracts, i.e. the optimal contract must enforce maximum e¤ort (Theorem 4 in Section 4.3).
3 Log Utility
Local Constraints
A candidate contract must satisfy (up to) three local incentive compatibility constraints. The e¤ort (EF) constraint ensures that the agent exerts the maximum level of e¤ort (a t = a). The private savings (PS) constraint ensures that the agent consumes the full income provided by the contract (c t = y t ). The no-manipulation (NM) constraint ensures that the agent does not engage in manipulation (m t;i = 0). To show the e¤ect of allowing private savings and manipulation on the contract, we consider versions of the model in which private savings and/or manipulation are impossible (and so the PS and/or NM constraints are not imposed).
Consider an arbitrary contract fy t ; t = 1; : : : T g, a consumption strategy fc t ; t = 1; : : : T g; an e¤ort strategy fa t ; t = 1; : : : Lg and a manipulation strategy fm t ; t = 1; : : : Lg, where m t 2 R M : Recall that y t ; c t and m t depend on the entire history (r 1 ; : : : r t ) and a t depends on (r 1 ; : : : r t 1 ; t ): 11 To capture history-dependence, we denote by E t the expectation conditional on the history (r 1 ; : : : r t ).
We …rst address the EF constraint and consider a local deviation in the action a t after 10 If the CEO engages in multiple manipulations at time t, the signal becomes S 0 t+j = S t+j exp(m s;i 1 s+i>t + P s t i M (m s;i )) and the return changes to r
history (r 1 ; : : : r t 1 ; t ): The derivative of CEO utility with respect to a t is
Since @r t =@a t = 1 and @U=@a t = t c t ( h 0 (a t ))u 0 (c t h(a t )), the EF constraint is:
We next consider the PS constraint. If the CEO saves a small amount d t in period t and invests it until t + 1; his utility increases to the leading order by:
To deter private saving or borrowing, this change should be zero to the leading order, i.e.
This is the standard Euler equation for consumption smoothing: discounted marginal utility e Rt t h(a t )u 0 (c t h(a t )) is a martingale. Intuitively, if it were not a martingale, the agent would privately reallocate consumption to the time periods with higher marginal utility. The Euler equation can be contrasted with the "Inverse Euler Equation" (IEE), which characterizes solutions to agency problems without the possibility of private saving and thus the PS constraint, when utility is additively separable in consumption and e¤ort (Rogerson (1985) , Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) and Farhi and Werning (2009) ). In our model, utility becomes additive if u(x) = ln x, and the IEE is:
The IEE states that the inverse of the agent's discounted marginal utility e Rt t c t , which equals the marginal cost of delivering utility to the agent, is a martingale. If (8) did not hold, the principal would shift the agent's utility to periods with a lower marginal cost of delivering utility. This argument is invalid for 6 = 1, because the agent's marginal cost of e¤ort depends on his consumption when utility is nonadditive. Finally, we consider the NM constraint. If the agent engages in a small manipulation (m t;i ) at time t, his utility changes to the leading order by
To prevent manipulation, this change must be zero. Since (0) = 0 (0) = 0, this implies
The Contract
We now derive the cheapest contract that satis…es the local constraints. We …rst consider log utility as the expressions are most tractable; Section 4 considers 6 = 1.
Theorem 1 (Log utility.) The cheapest contract that satis…es the local constraints and implements maximum e¤ort and zero manipulation is as follows. In each period t, the CEO is paid c t which satis…es:
where s and k s are constants. If manipulation is impossible, the slope s is given by
If manipulation is possible, s is given by:
If private saving is impossible, the constant k s is given by:
If private saving is possible, k s is given by:
The initial condition c 0 is chosen to give the agent his reservation utility u:
Heuristic proof. The Appendix contains a full proof; here we present a heuristic proof in a simple case that gives the key intuition. We consider a two-period model with no discounting, i.e. L = T = 2, = 1, R = 0, with the PS constraint but without the NM constraint. We wish to show that the optimal contract is given by:
for some constants 1 (the equivalent of ln c 0 + k 1 in the Theorem) and k 2 that make the IR constraint bind.
Step 1: Optimal log-linear contract We …rst solve the problem in a restricted class where contracts are log-linear, i.e.:
for some constants 1 , 21 ; 2 , 1 ; k 2 . This …rst step is not necessary but clari…es the economics, and is helpful in more complex cases to guess the form of the optimal contract. First, intuitively, the optimal contract entails consumption smoothing, i.e. shocks to consumption are permanent. This implies 21 = 1 . To prove this, the PS constraint (7) yields:
This must hold for all r 1 . Therefore, 21 = 1 and k 2 = ln E 1 e 2 r 2 , as in (14) . Next, consider total utility U :
From (6), the two EF conditions are
Intuitively, the EF constraints should bind (proven in the Appendix), else the CEO is exposed to unnecessary risk. Combining the binding version of these constraints with (16) , the optimal contract is given by (15).
Step 2: Optimality of log-linear contracts We next verify that optimal contracts should be log-linear. Equation (6) yields:
The cheapest contract involves this local EF condition binding, i.e.
Integrating yields the contract:
where B (r 1 ) is a function of r 1 which we will determine shortly. It is the integration "constant" of equation (18) viewed from time 2.
We next apply the PS constraint (7) for t = 1:
Hence, we obtain ln c 1 = B (r 1 ) + K;
where the constant K is independent of r 1 . (In this proof, K, K 0 and K 00 are constants independent of r 1 and r 2 .) Total utility is:
We next apply (6) to (22) to yield: 2B 0 (r 1 ) g 0 (a) : Again, the cheapest contract involves this condition binding, i.e. 2B 0 (r 1 ) = g 0 (a) : Integrating yields:
Combining (23) with (21) 
for some constant k 2 . We now discuss the economics behind the contract. (10) shows that time-t income should be linked to the return not only in period t, but also in all previous periods. Therefore, e¤ort boosts income in both the current and all future periods. We call this the "deferred reward principle": since the CEO is risk-averse, it is e¢ cient to spread the reward for e¤ort over the future. Similarly, to optimize intertemporal risk-sharing, the impact of any negative shock to r 1 (due to a low 1 ) should be spread over all future periods.
We now consider how the contract sensitivity changes over time. We …rst consider the case where manipulation is impossible and so the NM constraint is not imposed. (11) shows that, in an in…nite horizon model (T = ! 1), the sensitivity is constant and given by:
This time-independent sensitivity is intuitive: the contract must be su¢ ciently sharp to compensate for the disutility of e¤ort, which is constant. However, for any …nite model, (11) shows that t is increasing over time. To understand the intuition for this "increasing incentives principle", we distinguish between the following variables: the increase in lifetime utility for exerting e¤ort (@U=@a t ), the increase in current utility (@u t =@a t ), the increase in current pay (@c t =@a t ) and the increase in wealth (@A t =@a t , where
is wealth, i.e. the NPV of all future pay). The increase in lifetime utility @U=@a t is constant, given the con-stant disutility of e¤ort. When there are fewer remaining periods over which to smooth out this lifetime increase, the current increase in utility (@u t =@a t ) must be higher; this in turn requires a greater increase in current pay (@c t =@a t ). In addition, a given lifetime increase in utility @U=@a t translates into a greater increase in wealth @A t =@a t . 12 As the CEO becomes older, a given increase in wealth provides the CEO with less lifetime utility, because he is forced to consume it over fewer future periods. Thus, a greater increase in wealth is needed to provide the same utility gain and maintain incentives. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) also predict that the current reward for e¤ort (both @c t =@a t and @u t =@a t ) rises over time, but not because of consumption smoothing considerations. Instead it is because the CEO is incentivized not only through pay but by the fact that improved performance boosts his labor market reputation.
As the CEO approaches retirement, career concerns become weaker and so monetary incentives must be strengthened: the increase in lifetime utility for e¤ort given by the current contract (@U=@a t ) goes up. In Garrett and Pavan (2009), @U=@a t increases over time to minimize the agent's informational rents. Here, @U=@a t is constant since we have no adverse selection or career concerns: there is no uncertainty about CEO quality and returns are a signal of e¤ort alone. Next, we study the impact of manipulation on the contract. From (12), the possibility of manipulation has three e¤ects. First, the CEO's income remains sensitive to …rm returns after his retirement in period L: it remains sensitive until period L + M , by which time all manipulation has been reversed. This deters him from in ‡ating returns just before retirement. 13 Second, the contract sensitivity t is higher in each period, because the contract must now satisfy the NM constraint as well as the EF constraint. Third, t trends upwards more rapidly over time. If t were constant, the CEO would have an incentive to in ‡ate the time-t return, thus increasing his time-t consumption. Even though the return at time t + i t will be lower, the e¤ect on the CEO's utility is discounted. Therefore, an increasing sensitivity is necessary to deter manipulation. For example, in an in…nite horizon model (T = 1), the possibility of manipulation changes the slope from the constant (24) to
The 1 t term demonstrates the increasing slope. The more impatient the CEO, the greater the incentives to manipulate, and so the greater the required increase in sensitivity over time to deter manipulation. In a …nite horizon model, t is already increasing if manipulation is impossible; the feasibility of manipulation causes it to rise even faster. Finally, the possibility of private saving a¤ects the constant k t but not the sensitivity t . Since private saving does not a¤ect the agent's action and thus …rm returns, the sensitivity of pay to returns is unchanged. Instead, it alters the time trend in the level of pay. The constant k t , which is related to the rate of increase in the agent's pay, is greater in (14) where private saving is possible than in (13) where private saving is impossible. The faster upward trend means that the contract e¤ectively saves for the agent, removing the need for him to do so himself. This result is consistent with He (2008b) , who …nds that the optimal contract under private savings involves a wage pattern that is non-decreasing over time.
The contract in Theorem 1 involves binding local constraints and implements maximum e¤ort and zero manipulation in each period. The remaining steps are to show that the agent will not wish to undertake global deviations (e.g. make large single-action changes, or simultaneously reduce e¤ort, save and/or manipulate) and that the principal cannot improve by implementing a di¤erent e¤ort level or allowing slack constraints. Since these proofs are equally clear for general as for log utility, we delay them until Section 4.
A Numerical Example
This optional section uses a simple numerical example to show most clearly the deferred reward and increasing incentives principles, as well as the e¤ect of manipulation on the contract. We …rst set T = 3, L = 3, = 0 and g 0 (a) = 1, and assume that manipulation is impossible. From (11), the contract is given by:
where t = P t s=1 k s . This example shows both principles at work. First, an increase in r 1 leads to a permanent increase in log consumption (and thus utility) -it rises by
in all future periods. Second, the sensitivity increases over time, from 1=3 to 1=2 to 1=1.
We now allow the CEO to continue to live after he retires, by now considering T = 5 but retaining all of the previous parameters. The optimal contract is now:
The possibility of manipulation means that the CEO's income now depends on r 4 , otherwise he would have an incentive to boost r 3 at the expense of r 4 . The contract is unchanged for t 3, i.e. for the periods in which the CEO works. Even under the original contract, there is no incentive to manipulate at t = 1 or t = 2 because two conditions are satis…ed. First, there is no discounting, and so the negative e¤ect of manipulation on future returns reduces the CEO's lifetime utility by as much as the positive e¤ect on current returns increases it. Comparing (11) and (12) shows that, if < 1 (i.e. there is discounting), the possibility of manipulation causes the contract slope to rise at all t. Second, because the marginal cost of e¤ort is constant across periods, the lifetime e¤ect of increasing returns is the same regardless of the period in which the higher returns arise. For example, increasing r 1 by one unit raises consumption in each period by 1=5 units, and so 1 unit in total. Decreasing r 2 by one unit reduces consumption in each period by 1=4 units, and so 1 unit in total. Again, the costs and bene…ts of manipulation are the same, so there is no incentive to manipulate (i.e. increase r 1 at the expense of r 2 ) even under the original contract. Appendix B in the Online Appendix shows that the contract changes for t 3 under a variable cost of e¤ort.
Implementation: the Dynamic Incentive Account
From Theorem 1, we have ln c t ln c t 1 = t r t + k t :
The percentage change in CEO pay is linear in the …rm's return r t , i.e. the percentage change in …rm value. The relevant measure of incentives is thus the elasticity of CEO pay to …rm value; this elasticity must be t for incentive compatibility. Empiricists have used a number of statistics to measure incentives -Jensen and Murphy (1990) calculate "dollar-dollar" incentives (the dollar change in CEO pay for a dollar change in …rm value) and Hall and Liebman (1998) measure "dollar-percent"incentives (the dollar change in CEO pay for a percentage …rm return.) By contrast, Murphy (1999) advocates elasticities ("percent-percent" incentives) on empirical grounds: they are invariant to …rm size and thus comparable across …rms of di¤erent size (as found by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) ), and …rm returns have much greater explanatory power for percentage than dollar changes in pay. Thus, …rms behave as if they target percentpercent incentives. However, he notes that "elasticities have no corresponding agency-theoretic interpretation."Our framework provides a theoretical justi…cation for using elasticities to measure incentives. Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) show that multiplicative preferences and production functions generate elasticities as the incentive measure and thus achieve the correct scaling of incentives with …rm size, which motivates their use in this paper (equations (1) and (3)).
14 Their result was derived in a one-period model with a risk-neutral CEO; we extend it to a dynamic model with risk aversion, manipulation and private saving. In real variables, percent-percent incentives equal the fraction of total pay that is comprised of stock. The required fraction ( t ) is independent of total pay and …rm size, i.e. scale-independent. To ensure that percent-percent incentives equal t in each period t, the contract can be implemented in the following simple manner. The present value of the CEO's expected pay is escrowed into a "Dynamic Incentive Account" ("DIA") at the start of t = 1. A proportion 1 is invested in the …rm's stock and the remainder in cash. At the start of each subsequent period t, the DIA is rebalanced so that the proportion invested in the …rm's stock is t . 15 This 14 Peng and Roell (2009) also use a multiplicative speci…cation and restrict analysis to contracts where log pay is linear in …rm returns. This paper endogenizes the contract form and provides a microfoundation for considering only loglinear contracts. 15 The justi…cation is as follows. 
A t is obtained by investing account the residual value A t 1 c t 1 in a continuously rebalanced portfolio with a proportion t in stocks. ($1 invested at time t 1 in such an asset yields e R e trt =E t 1 e trt , because the stock's expected return is R.) This is precisely the implementation via a DIA. Note that the stock pays the …rm's actual return. As noted in footnote 5, r t is not the …rm's actual return, but the actual return plus a constant. This does not a¤ect the implementability with stock because it only changes the constant k t , which rebalancing addresses a common problem of options: if …rm value declines, their delta and thus incentive e¤ect is reduced. Unrebalanced shares su¤er a similar problem, even though their delta is …xed at 1 regardless of …rm value. The relevant measure of incentives is not the delta of the CEO's portfolio (which represents dollar-dollar incentives) but the value of the CEO's equity as a fraction of his total wealth (percent-percent incentives). When the stock price falls, this fraction, and thus the CEO's incentives, are reduced. The DIA addresses this problem by exchanging stock for cash, to maintain the fraction at t . Importantly, the additional stock is accompanied by a reduction in cash -it is not given for free. This addresses a major concern with repricing options after negative returns to restore incentives -the CEO is rewarded for failure. 16 On the other hand, if the share price rises, the stock fraction grows.
Therefore, some shares can be sold for cash, thus reducing the CEO's risk, without incentives falling below t . Indeed, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2008) …nd that decreases in CEO ownership typically follow good performance. Core and Larcker (2002) study stock ownership guidelines, whereby boards set minimum requirements for executive shareholdings. In only 7% of cases do the requirements relate to the number of shares, which would require no rebalancing and imply that boards target dollar-dollar incentives. In all other cases, they relate to the value of shares as a multiple of salary: consistent with our model, this involves some rebalancing and implies targeting of percent-percent incentives. The DIA thus features dynamic rebalancing to ensure that the EF constraint is satis…ed in the current period. This rebalancing is state-dependent: if the stock price rises (falls), stock is sold (bought) for cash. The second key feature of the DIA is gradual vesting. This vesting is time-dependent: regardless of the account's value, the CEO can only withdraw a percentage t in each period for consumption (we will later derive t in speci…c cases). This gradual vesting plays two roles. First, it helps ensure that the EF constraint is satis…ed in future periods, by guaranteeing that the CEO has su¢ cient wealth in the account for the principal to "play with" so that she can achieve the required equity stake by rebalancing this wealth. This role exists during the CEO's employment. Second, it ensures that the NM constraint is satis…ed in the current period: it prevents the CEO from manipulating returns and then cashing out his equity before the manipulation is revealed. This role exists both during the CEO's employment and after retirement. 17 Thus, if manipulation is impossible, vesting is gradual only during employment and the account fully vests in period L. If manipulation is possible, gradual vesting continues after retirement and the account only fully vests in period rises by t (a R + ln E [e t ]). 16 Achraya, John and Sundaram (2000) show that the cost of rewarding failure may be outweighed by the bene…t of reincentivization, and so repricing options can be optimal. The rebalancing in the DIA achieves the bene…t of reincentivization without the cost of rewarding failure. 17 Put di¤erently, satisfying the time-t EF constraint requires su¢ cient equity in period t, which is achieved by gradual vesting before period t to ensure that the CEO will have enough wealth in the account in period t, and rebalancing what wealth he does have in period t. Satisfying the time-t NM constraint requires su¢ cient equity in periods t + i, i M , which is achieved by slow vesting between period t and each future period. In sum, the DIA has two key features: time-dependent vesting to deter current manipulation and induce future e¤ort, and state-dependent rebalancing to induce current e¤ort while minimizing the CEO's risk. Some existing compensation schemes satisfy the …rst feature, but not the second. For example, restricted stock and options satisfy the NM constraint but not the EF constraint when …rm value changes over time.
Note that the DIA represents only one possible implementation of the optimal contract. Other implementations are possible: rather than placing the present value of future salary into an account and rebalancing, the principal can simply pay the agent the amount c t speci…ed by the contract in each period, i.e. implement the contract with purely ‡ow compensation without the need to set up an account. The DIA implementation highlights the economic interpretation of such a payment scheme: it has the same e¤ect as if the CEO's present value of future pay was escrowed, rebalanced and gradually vested.
Finally, we calculate the vesting percentage in a number of core cases. Recall
denotes the value of the DIA at date t, i.e. the present value of future consumption under maximum e¤ort, where c t = c 0 e P t s=1 srs+ks . While A t typically involves a complex sum of very many terms, in certain core cases these terms collapse into simple expressions. If private savings are impossible, the IEE gives us that inverse discounted marginal utility t e Rt c t is a martingale, and so A t = c t 1 T t = (1 ). Thus the vesting fraction is t = c t =A t = (1 ) = 1 T t . In an in…nite horizon, the vesting fraction is = 1 and timeindependent, just like the contract sensitivity. 18 If the horizon is …nite, t is increasing over time. This is intuitive: since the CEO has fewer periods over which to enjoy his wealth, he should consume a greater percentage in later periods. The account vests at time L if manipulation is possible, and L + M if manipulation is possible. We can also calculate in an in…nite horizon model where manipulation is impossible. Since the problem is stationary and the CEO exhibits constant relative risk aversion, he wishes to consume a constant fraction of his wealth in each period and so c t = A t . If private saving is impossible, we have just seen that = 1 . If private saving is possible and noise s is i.i.d., we …nd = 1 E e E e < 1 . 19 The intuition is as follows. The agent would like to invest zero wealth in the stock as it carries a zero risk premium, but he is forced to invest and bear unrewarded risk. Therefore, he wishes to save to insure himself against this risk. To remove these incentives, we must have < 1 so that the account grows faster than it vests, thus providing automatic saving for the agent.
Generalization and Justi…cation
Section 4.1 generalizes our contract to all CRRA utility functions and autocorrelated noise, and shows that the local EF constraint must bind. Section 4.2 derives su¢ cient conditions for the contract to be fully incentive compatible (i.e. the agent deters global deviations) and Section 4.3 proves that, if the …rm is su¢ ciently large, the optimal contact indeed requires maximum e¤ort in every period and after every history.
General CRRA Utility and Autocorrelated Signals
The core model assumes that the signal r t was the …rm's stock return and so it is reasonable to assume the noises t are uncorrelated. However, in private …rms, there is no stock return, and so alternative signals of e¤ort must be used such as pro…ts. Unlike stock returns, shocks to pro…ts may be serially correlated. This subsection extends the model to such a case. We now assume that t follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive parameter , i.e. t = t 1 + " t ; 2 [0; 1]; where " t are independent and bounded above and below by " t and " t .
We also now allow for a general CRRA utility function. Note that for 6 = 1, the IEE is not valid if private savings are impossible, so we only consider the case where the PS constraint is imposed. We de…ne B t = t e (1 )g(a) for t L and B t = t otherwise.
Theorem 2 (General CRRA utility, autocorrelated noise, with the PS constraint.) The cheapest contract that satis…es the local constraints and implements maximum e¤ort and zero manipulation is as follows. In each period t, the CEO is paid c t which satis…es:
where s and k s are constants and r 0 = 0. If manipulation is impossible, the slope s is given 19 We have k s = R + ln + ln E e ( a+ ) , and E e rs+k = E e e R E e = e R , where = E e E e . Hence, for s t, E t e R(s t) c s = c t s t and A t = E t P 1 s=t e R(s t) c s ds
by:
0 for t > L:
If manipulation is possible, t is given by:
The constant k t is given by
The initial condition c 0 is chosen to give the agent his reservation utility u, and D is the lowest constant such that:
Proof See Appendix. From (27) we can see the e¤ect of allowing for general CRRA utility functions and autocorrelated noise. Moving from log to CRRA utility but retaining independent noise has little e¤ect on the functional form of the optimal contract, which remains independent of the utility function and the noise distribution in a particular period. The deferred reward and increasing incentive principles, the e¤ect of the NM constraint, and the implementation via the DIA remain the same. The di¤erence is that the parameters and k are somewhat more complex. To understand the intuition behind the drivers of , consider the benchmark case where = 0, L = T and manipulations are impossible. Then, the slope (27) becomes
which stems directly from the EF condition. Under plausible parameterizations of the model (e.g., Gaussian noise), when 1, the slope increases over time up to T = g 0 (a) and is higher if the agent is more risk averse (higher ) and less patient (lower ), and stock return volatility is higher. (The full derivations are in the Online Appendix.) Intuitively, these changes decrease the utility the agent derives from future consumptions, E t c 1 t
, which is in the denominator of (30) . Since future rewards are insu¢ cient to induce e¤ort, the CEO must be given a higher sensitivity to current consumption. Equation (27) shows that, with autocorrelated signals, the optimal contract links the percentage change in CEO pay in period t to innovations in the signal (r t r t 1 ) between t and t 1, rather than the absolute signal in period t. This is intuitive: since good luck (i.e. a positive shock) in the last period carries over to the current period, the contract should control for the last period's signal to avoid paying the CEO for luck. 20 
Global Constraints
We have thus far derived the best contract that satis…es the local constraints. The next stage is to verify that this contract also satis…es the global constraints, i.e. the agent does not wish to undertake global deviations. The following analysis derives su¢ cient conditions on g and to guarantee this. The contract in Theorem 2 pays the agent an income y t , given by:
where
with m s;i = 0 for s > L; is the overall e¤ect of manipulations on the return in period s.
The following Theorem states that if the cost functions g and are su¢ ciently convex, the CEO has no pro…table global deviation. # (33) with P T t=1 e rt (y t c t ) 0 and y t satisfying (31) . If functions g and are su¢ ciently convex, i.e. inf m 00 (m) and inf a g 00 (a) are su¢ ciently large, the solution of this problem is c t y t ; t T; and a t a; m t 0; t L. In other words, there is no global deviation from the recommended policy that makes the agent better o¤.
The proof, in the Appendix, may be of general methodological interest. It involves three steps. First, we reparameterize the agent's utility from being a function of consumption and e¤ort to one of consumption and leisure, where the new variable, leisure, is de…ned to ensure that utility is jointly concave in both arguments. Second, we construct an "upper-linearization" function: we create a surrogate agent with a linear state-dependent utility. Third, we prove that any global deviation by the surrogate agent weakly reduces his utility. Since there is no motive to save under linear utility, we only need to show that the present value of the agent's income is concave in the agent's two other decisions, leisure (and thus e¤ort) and manipulation. This is true if the cost of e¤ort g and the cost of manipulation are su¢ ciently convex. 21 Since utility is linear in consumption, and consumption equals income, the utility function is concave in leisure and manipulation and so there is no pro…table deviation. Since our original agent's utility function is concave, his utility is the same as the surrogate agent's under the recommended policy, and weakly lower under any other policy. Thus, any deviation also reduces the original agent's utility. The third step is a Lemma that shows that the present value of income is a concave function of actions under suitable reparameterization. It thus may have broader applicability to other agency theories, allowing the use of the …rst-order approach to signi…cantly simplify the problem.
The Optimality of Maximum E¤ort
This section derives conditions under which the principal wishes to implement maximum e¤ort in every period and after every history (the "maximum e¤ort principle"), for the baseline case in which manipulation is impossible. 22 We conjecture that a similar result holds for the case where manipulation is possible, but given the high complexity of the existing proof, we leave this extension to future research.
Theorem 4 (Maximum e¤ort is optimal.) Assume that inf 2( ; ) f ( ) > 0 and sup a2(a;a) g 00 (a) g 02 (a) < 1, where f is the probability density of . There exists X such that if baseline …rm size X is greater than X , implementing maximum e¤ort as in Theorems 1 and 2 is optimal.
The intuition is as follows. For any alternative contract satisfying the incentive constraints, we compare the bene…ts and costs of moving to a maximum e¤ort contract. The bene…ts are multiplicative in …rm size. The costs comprise the direct disutility from working (which are multiplicative in the CEO's wage), the risk premium required to compensate the CEO for a variable contract, and the change in CEO's informational rent (which are both also a function of the CEO's wage). Since the CEO's wage is substantially smaller than …rm size, the bene…ts of maximum e¤ort outweigh the costs. In practice, a maximum e¤ort level arises because there is a limit to the number of productive activities the CEO can undertake to bene…t the principal. Under the literal interpretation of a as e¤ort, there is a …nite number of positive-NPV projects available and a limit to the number of hours a day the CEO can work while 21 See Dittmann and Yu (2009) for a similar convexity condition to ensure that the local optimum is globally optimal. They consider a one-period model where private saving and manipulation are not possible, but the CEO chooses risk as well as e¤ort. 22 EG derive this result in a one-period model; this section extends this maximum e¤ort principle to a multiperiod setting with intermediate consumption and private saving. remaining productive. Under the interpretation of a as rent extraction, a re ‡ects zero stealing. The Online Appendix o¤ers a similar microfoundation for the optimality of zero manipulation.
The complexity in the proof lies in deriving an upper bound on the cost of the information rent (which stems from the CEO's private information about the noise ) and the risk imposed on the CEO from a performance-sensitive contract (which depends on the CEO's ability to selfinsure via privately saving). Any change in the implemented e¤ort level requires adjusting the wage not only in a particular period for the whole range of noises, but also across time periods to deter private saving. Speci…cally, in any period t and given any past history, any incentive compatible contract must satisfy the di¤erential equation generalizing (6) . We use this fact to bound the expected cost of providing additional incentives to implementing maximum e¤ort in period t. Implementing maximum e¤ort in period t requires the time-t contract to change, to ensure incentive compatibility for any t . Moreover, the change in the time-t contract has a knock-on e¤ect on the time t 1 contract, which must change to deter private saving between time t 1 and time t. The change in the time t 1 contract impacts the time t 2 contract, and so on: due to private saving, the contract adjustments "resonate" across all time periods. It is this non-separability which signi…cantly complicates the problem.
Conclusion
This paper studies optimal CEO compensation in a dynamic setting in which the CEO consumes in each period, can privately save, and may temporarily manipulate returns. The optimal contract involves consumption smoothing, where current e¤ort is rewarded in all future periods, and the relevant measure of incentives is the percentage change in pay for a percentage change in …rm value. This required elasticity is constant over time in an in…nite horizon model where manipulation is impossible, and rising if the horizon is …nite or if manipulation is possible. Deterring manipulation also requires the CEO to remain sensitive to …rm returns after retirement. While the possibility of manipulation a¤ects the sensitivity of pay, the option to privately save impacts the level of pay. It augments the rise in compensation over time, removing the need for the CEO to save himself.
The optimal contract can be implemented using a Dynamic Incentive Account. The CEO's expected pay is placed into an account, of which a certain proportion is invested in the …rm's stock. The account features state-dependent rebalancing to ensure that, as the stock price changes, the CEO always has su¢ cient incentives to exert e¤ort at minimum risk. It also features time-dependent vesting, even after retirement, to deter manipulation.
Our key results are robust to a broad range of settings: general CRRA utility functions, all noise distributions with interval support, and autocorrelated noise. However, our setup imposes some limitations, in particular that the CEO remains with the …rm for a …xed period. Abstracting from imperfect commitment problems allows us to focus on a single source of market imperfection -moral hazard -and is common in the dynamic moral hazard literature (e.g. Lambert (1983) , Rogerson (1985) , Biais et al. (2007 Biais et al. ( , 2009 ). An interesting extension would be to allow for quits and …rings. In a competitive labor market, the contract will have to account for the possibility of voluntary departures (e.g. Gabaix (2007)). 23 We leave such extensions to future research.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
This is a direct corollary of Theorem 2.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We …rst analyze the case where manipulation is impossible and consider manipulation later. Case t > L. For t > L, r t is independent of the CEO's actions. Since the CEO is strictly risk averse, c t will depend only on r 1 ; :::; r L . Therefore either the PS constraint (7) 
for some constants 0 t independent of the returns, where
Since g is di¤erentiable, this yields (6) (see EG, Lemma 6), i.e.
for 6 = 1:
We now show that (36) binds. First, (36) implies that for any r 
Consider now the contract fc 0 t g t T that coincides with fc t g t T for t < L, ln c 
Condition (37) , (x) = e (1 )x 1 for 6 = 1 and (x) = e x , (x) = x for = 1, we have (see EG, Lemmas 1 and 2):
Consequently the contract fc 0 t g t T is cheaper than fc t g t T : Integrating out the binding version of (36) , the optimal contract is given by: ln c t (r 1 ; :::; r L ) = B(r 1 ; :::
for some function B and constants L ; t = L + 0 t for t > L, which will be computed explicitly at the end of the proof.
Case t < L. Suppose that for all t 0 , T t 0 > t, the optimal contract c t 0 is such that ln c t 0 (r 1 ; :::; r t 0 ) = B(r 1 ; :::; r t ) + t 0 r t 0 +
for some function B, constants t , and s as in the Theorem. The PS constraint yields
B t E t c t+1 = E t e t+1 r t+1 e B(r 1 ;:::;rt)+R t+1 +ln B t+1 ln Bt :
We therefore have 25 ln c t = B(r 1 ; :::; r t ) + t+1 r t + t ;
24 Let X and Y denote two random variables with cumulative distribution functions F and G and corresponding right continuous inverses F 1 and G 1 . X is said to be less dispersed than Y if and only if (40) can also be derived from the IEE if = 1:
for the appropriate constant t . As in the case t = L, the EF implies that:
B (r 1 ; :::r t 1 ; a + t + ")
B (r 1 ; :::r t 1 ; a + t + ") c
B (r 1 ; :::r t 1 ; a
The second equivalence above follows from the fact that for s > t
One can inductively show that for any t L, 0 t t+1 g 0 (a). Therefore, proceeding analogously as in the proof for t = L, we can establish that indeed (41) holds with equality.
Integrating out this equality we establish that for t yielding (29) . When the PS constraint is not imposed, we use (8) to derive (13) analogously. We now impose the NM constraint. Proceeding inductively as above, we have
with t = 0 for t > L + M , and k t as in the Theorem. The t are the lowest values such that the EF and NM constraints are satis…ed, i.e.:
; for 0 t L;
If we set
for some constants D i , i M , (43) is equivalent to
for 0 t L, i M . This yields the desired expressions for
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We divide the proof into the following steps.
Step 1. Change of variables. Consider the new variable x t , t L, and per period utility functions u(c t ; x t ) de…ned as:
where = sign(1 ); and let a t = f (x t ). x t measures the agent's leisure and f is the "production function"from leisure to e¤ort, which is decreasing and concave. The new variables are chosen so that u (c; x) is jointly concave in both arguments.
Let U (c t ) t T ; (x t ) t L = P T t=1 t u(c t ; x t ) be total discounted utility and consider the maximization problem: max
with P T t=1 e rt (y t c t ) 0 and y t satisfying
for m s de…ned in (32) , and f (x s ) = a for s > L. Problems (44) and (33) are equivalent: (x t ) t L ; (c t ) t T and (m t ) t L solve (44) if and only if (f (x t )) t L ; (c t ) t T and (m t ) t L solve (33) . The utility function U (c t ) t T ; (x t ) t L is jointly concave in (c t ) t T and (x t ) t L :
Step 2. Deriving an "upper linearization" utility function. Consider c t ( ) = c 0 exp P t s=1 s ( s + f (x s ) ( s 1 + f (x s 1 ))) + P t s=1 k s , the consumption for the recom-mended sequence of leisure on the path of noises = ( t ) t T (where f (x t ) = a), under no saving or manipulation. For any path of noises = ( t ) t T we introduce the "upper linearization"utility function b U :
where U;
@U @ct
and @U @xt are evaluated at the (noise dependent) target consumption and leisure levels (c t ( )) t T ; (x t ) t L ). Since U = U (c t ) t T ; (x t ) t L is jointly concave in (c t ) t T and (x t ) t L , we have:
Hence, to show that there are no pro…table deviations for EU , it is su¢ cient to show that there are no pro…table deviations for E b U . Moreover, since
when private savings are allowed, the PS constraint (7) implies that e rt @ b U @ct is a martingale. Therefore, the agent is indi¤erent about when he consumes income y t , and so we can evaluate E b U for c t y t . Since the agent has no motive to save, we only need to show that he has no motive to manipulate or change leisure (and thus e¤ort). 26 We also let utility be a function of (x t ) t L and (m t ) t L ; since they fully determine the process of income (y t ) t T and thus consumption (c t ) t T . The results are summarized in the following Lemma. (46) and y t as in (45) , and consider the following maximization problem:
If the target leisure level (x t ) t L and no manipulation, m t 0; t L; solve the maximization problem (47) then (c t ) t T , (x t ) t L and m t 0; t L; solve the maximization problem (44).
Step 3. Pathwise concavity of utility in leisure and manipulation for = 1. We must demonstrate that expected utility is jointly concave in leisure (x t ) t L and manipulations (m t ) t L , if the cost functions g and are su¢ ciently convex. For = 1, we can do so by proving pathwise concavity, i.e. that b U is concave for every path of noises. (We will deal with the case 6 = 1 in step 4). We have:
(48) Joint concavity of (48) in (x t ) t L and (m t ) t L , is equivalent to the joint concavity of "PV of income"function
To prove the latter we will use the following general Lemma.
Lemma 2 (Concavity of present values.) Let 
P T n=0 e n sup jt=2 , and at least one of these inequalities is strict. Then the function I is concave.
Loosely speaking, the Lemma states that, if j s and q t s are su¢ ciently concave, then the "present value of income" function I ((b t ) t L ) associated with them is also jointly concave in the sequence of decisions (b t ) t L . (The decision vector b is an M + 1-vector that incorporates both the scalar x and the M -vector m.) This is non-trivial to prove when T ! 1: for su¢ ciently large t, exp (tj (b)) is a convex function of b, because its second derivative (when b is one-dimensional) is exp (tj (b)) t tj 0 (b) 2 + j 00 (b) , which is positive for su¢ ciently large t. It is discounting (expressed by < 1) that allows the income function to be concave. We use Lemma 2 to prove the following result.
Lemma 3 (Concavity of present value of income.) The present value of income
is jointly concave in leisure (x t ) t L and manipulations (m t ) t L :
Step 4. Concavity of expected utility in leisure and manipulation for 6 = 1. When 6 = 1, linearized utility e U is:
Unlike when = 1, the second term in (51), i.e. the "PV of income function', now depends on noise . We therefore cannot prove pathwise concavity of linearized utility, and instead prove concavity of expected utility directly. Expected utility is given by
) is a martingale. The second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and M t ( ) being a martingale.
We use Lemma 2 to prove the following result.
Lemma 4 (Concavity of modi…ed present value of income.) The modi…ed present value of income
for m s de…ned in (32) and f (x s ) = a if s > L, is pathwise jointly concave in leisure (x t ) t L and manipulations (m t ) t L :
We now conclude the proof of the Theorem. From Theorem 2, E e U satis…es the …rst-order conditions at (x t ) t L and (m t ) t L . From step 4, E e U is also concave in (x t ) t L and (m t ) t L , and so the target leisure level (x t ) t L and no manipulations, m t 0, t L; solve the maximization problem (47) . Therefore, from Lemma 1, (c t ) t T , (x t ) t L and m t 0; t L; solve the maximization problem (44) , establishing the result.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We wish to show that, if baseline …rm size X is su¢ ciently large, the optimal contract implements maximum e¤ort (a t a for all t).
Fix any contract (A; Y ) that is incentive compatible and gives expected utility u, where A = fa 1 ; :::; a L g is the e¤ort schedule, To establish the result it is su¢ cient to show that we can …nd a di¤erent contract (A ; Y ) that implements maximum e¤ort (a t a for all t), and is not signi…cantly costlier than (A; Y ), in the sense that
for some linear function h; h : R L ! R; with h(0; :::; 0) = 0: This is su¢ cient, because if initial …rm size X is su¢ ciently large, then for every sequence of noises and actions, …rm value Xe
where D is the highest slope coe¢ cient of h. This in turn implies Xe
and so the bene…ts of implementing maximum e¤ort outweigh the costs, i.e. the RHS of (52) exceeds the LHS of (52) . To keep the proof concise we assume e r = 1, T = L and the noises t are independent across time. The general case is proven along analogously. We introduce the following notation. For any contract (A; Y ) and history t let u t ( t ) =
[yt( t)e g(a t ( t )) ] 1 1 (or u t ( t ) = ln y t ( t ) g(a t ( t )) for = 1) denote the CEO's stage game utility for truthful reporting in period t after history t when he consumes his income, let U t ( t ) = E t h P L s=t s t u s ( s ) i denote his continuation utility, and mu t ( t ) = y t ( t )e (1 )g(at( t )) denote his marginal utility of consumption. We divide the proof into the following six steps.
Step 1. Local necessary conditions. First, we generalize the local e¤ort constraint (6) to contracts that need not implement maximum e¤ort.
Lemma 5 Fix an incentive compatible contract (A; Y ), with each a t ( t 1 ; ) continuous almost everywhere and bounded on every compact subinterval, and a history t 1 . The CEO's continuation utility U t ( t 1 ; t ) must satisfy the following: U t ( t 1 ; t ) = U t ( t 1 ; ) + Z t [y t ( t 1 ; x)e g(at( t 1 ;x)) ] 1 g 0 (a t ( t 1 ; x))dx;
with y t ( t ) > 0:
Step 2. Bound on the cost of incentives per period. For any history t 1 and contract (A; Y ), consider "repairing" the contract at time t as follows. Following any history t 1 ; , multiply all the payo¤s by the appropriate constant ( t 1 ; ) such that the continuation utilities U # t ( t 1 ; t ) for the resulting contract satisfy (54) with a t ( t 1 ; t ) = a for all t : In other words, the local EF constraint for maximum e¤ort at time t after history t 1 is satis…ed. The following Lemma bounds the expectation of how much we have to scale up the payo¤s by the expectation of how much the target e¤ort falls short of the maximum e¤ort. 
Then:
where '(x) = e g 0 (a) sup g 00 f g 02 x 1 + 1 <1 e g(a) g(a) g 0 (a)(1 )x for 6 = 1,
'(x) = e g 0 (a) sup g 00 f g 02 x 1 + e g(a) g(a) g 0 (a)x for = 1, and f is the pdf of noise .
Step 3. Constructing the contract that satis…es the local EF constraint in every period. We want to use the procedure from step 2 to construct a new contract (A x ; Y x ) that requires maximum e¤ort, satis…es the local EF in every period, and has a cost di¤erence over (A; Y ) that is bounded by how much (A; Y ) falls short of maximum e¤ort. For this we need the following Lemma. Given an incentive compatible contract (A; Y ), we construct the contract (A x ; Y x ) as follows.
The contract always prescribes maximum e¤ort. Regarding the payo¤s, for any period t after a history t 1 we …rst multiply all payo¤s after history ( t 1 ; ) with …xed constants ( t 1 ; ) > 1 as in Lemma 6 so that the resulting utilities U # t ( t ) satisfy (55). Then we multiply all payo¤s following history t 1 by the appropriate constant pu ( t 1 ) < 1 so that for the resulting contract (A x ; Y x ) we obtain the original promised utility, i.e. U t 1 ( t 1 ) = U x t 1 ( t 1 ). By construction and the above Lemmas, the contract (A x ; Y x ) satis…es the local EF constraint. In particular, due to Lemma 7, repairing the contract after history t 1 will not upset the local EF constraint after history t 1 ; t . The original contract (A; Y ) satis…es the local PS constraint, i.e. the current marginal utility of consumption always equals the next-period expected marginal utility. Providing incentives for maximum e¤ort in contract (A x ; Y x ) upsets this condition. In the following two steps, given (A x ; Y x ); we construct the contract (A ; Y ) that also satis…es the local PS constraint and is not much costlier. In particular, we show that the extent to which the marginal utilities of consumption in (A ; Y ) depart from the marginal utilities in (A x ; Y x ) is bounded by the extent to which e¤ort falls short of maximum e¤ort in contract (A; Y ):
Step 4. Bound on the decrease of expected MU of consumption per period. We split this step into two Lemmas. The …rst bounds the expected decrease in marginal utility of consumption from providing incentives for maximum e¤ort in the current period, as in step 2. The second bounds the decrease in expected marginal utility by the expected decrease of the marginal utility. Step 5. Constructing the contract that satis…es the local PS constraint in every period. Providing incentives for maximum e¤ort in (A x ; Y x ) at (say) time L a¤ects the marginal utility of consumption in period L and upsets the PS constraint in period L 1: However, restoring the PS constraint in period L 1 will a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption in period L 1 and so upset the PS constraint in period L 2, and so on. In the following Lemma we bound this overall e¤ect using Lemma 8 and iteratively Lemma 9.
Lemma 10 There is a contract (A ; Y ) that implements maximal e¤ort and satis…es the local EF and PS constraints, and for every history t :
where ( Step 6. Bounding the cost di¤erence (52) . By construction, contract (A ; Y ) from Lemma 10 implements maximum e¤ort, causes the local EF constraint to bind, satis…es the local PS constraint and leaves the CEO with the expected discounted utility u. Therefore it is identical to the contract from Theorem 2, and so also satis…es the global constraints (Theorem 3). It therefore remains to prove (52) .
One can verify that for some D 3 > 0 for every history t we have y t ( t ) where ' is as in Lemma 6, while and are as in Lemma 10. All functions '; ; ; Q L s=t+1 x s and x 1 are continuously di¤erentiable and take value 1 for argument(s) equal to 1, whereas a a t ( t ) is bounded. Therefore there is a linear function h : R L ! R with h(0; :::; 0) = 0 such that (52) is satis…ed. The above proof is for the case where private saving is possible as this is the more complex case. If = 1 and private saving is impossible, step 4 is not needed and Lemma 10 in step 5 and step 6 become signi…cantly simpler.
